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Abstract
Domain Name System (DNS) cache poisoning is a stepping stone towards advanced (cyber) attacks. DNS cache
poisoning can be used to monitor users’ activities for censorship, to distribute malware and spam and to subvert
correctness and availability of Internet clients and services. Currently, the DNS infrastructure relies on challenge-
response defences against attacks by (the common) off-path adversaries. Such defences do not suffice against
stronger, man-in-the-middle (MitM), adversaries. However, MitM is not believed to be common; hence, there seems to
be little motivation to adopt systematic, cryptographic mechanisms. We show that challenge-response do not protect
against cache poisoning. In particular, we review common situations where (1) attackers can frequently obtain MitM
capabilities and (2) even weaker attackers can subvert DNS security. We also experimentally study dependencies in
the DNS infrastructure, in particular, dependencies within domain registrars and within domains, and show that
multiple dependencies result in more vulnerable DNS. We review domain name system security extensions (DNSSEC),
the defence against DNS cache poisoning, and argue that not only it is the most suitable mechanism for preventing
cache poisoning but it is also the only proposed defence that enables a posteriori forensic analysis of attacks.
Keywords: DNS cache poisoning; Domain hijacking; Cyber attacks; Cyber security
1 Introduction
During the recent decade, the Internet has experienced an
increase in sophisticated attacks, subverting stability and
correctness of many networks and services. The attacks
target individuals as well as enterprises and exploit vulner-
abilities in systems and services in the Internet, e.g., WEB
and cloud, as well as in basic building blocks of the Inter-
net, such as DomainName System (DNS), [RFC882,1034],
and routing. The attacks inflict economical losses to busi-
nesses and have a devastating impact on e-commerce,
security and critical infrastructure.
In this work, we focus on DNS, whose correctness and
availability are critical to the functionality of the Inter-
net. We investigate one of the most significant threats to
DNS infrastructure: cache poisoning. In a cache poison-
ing attack, the adversary causes recursive DNS resolvers
to accept and cache a spoofed DNS response which con-
tains malicious records. These records redirect the victim
clients to incorrect (possibly malicious) hosts. DNS cache
poisoning is detrimental to correct functionality of Inter-
net services and can be used to distribute malware and
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spam and can be applied for phishing attacks, credentials
theft, eavesdropping and more.
To prevent DNS cache poisoning attacks, most sys-
tems adopt challenge-response mechanisms, [RFC6056,
RFC5452], whereby a random challenge is sent within
the request and a corresponding value is verified to have
been echoed in responses. However, challenge-response
authentication is not effective against man-in-the-middle
(MitM) adversaries (Figure 1), which can inspect the
challenges sent within the requests, and craft spoofed
responses with valid challenge values. However, it is typ-
ically assumed that the common adversary in the Inter-
net is off-path, which unlike a MitM, cannot observe
nor modify legitimate packets exchanged between other
parties.
Recently, a number of vulnerabilities were shown, allow-
ing off-path attackers to predict values of challenge-
response defences, exposing the recursive DNS resolvers
to off-path cache poisoning attacks [1-6]. Some of these
vulnerabilities were already patched, e.g., [7,8]. These
attacks in tandem with the recent revelations on the
surveillance programs, such as the ones carried out by the
National Security Agency (NSA) [9,10], raise the question
whether the widely deployed challenge-response defences
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Figure 1Man-in-the-middle attacker model.
suffice to ensure security of services and networks that
rely on the correctness and availability of DNS.
We explore DNS security and review the threats that
stem from the ubiquitious Internet connectivity, from the
cyber arms race, advances in adversarial capabilities and
from vulnerable systems. Our review of the recently pub-
lished vulnerabilities, shows that systems, services and
clients are vulnerable and may be frequently attacked.
Widely deployed defences against off-path adversaries do
not provide the adequate level of security required to
thwart attacks by the modern adversaries. Dependencies
within the DNS infrastructure, [11,12], further exacerbate
the risk of attacks.
We believe that the main factor to this unfortunate sit-
uation is that the attacks that do not break connectivity
go undetected - which is indeed the case with advanced,
cyber and Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) attacks. For
instance, recent hijacking of google.rw by the Syrian
hackers [13] would go undetected had it not broken access
to the target domains, and the surveillance by the US
agencies would not be unveiled had it not been exposed
by a whistleblower.
Our main message in this work is that domain name
system security extensions (DNSSEC) is the most suitable
defence for DNS against cache poisoning attacks. As we
show, the significance of DNSSEC is not only in prevent-
ing cache poisoning (and thus other advanced) attacks but
also in its ability to enable detection of attacks a posteri-
ori. In fact, DNSSEC is the only mechanism that facilitates
forensic analysis of attacks and provides evidences, which
can be presented to third parties and which allow detec-
tion of attacks even by very strong adveraries, such as
goverment agencies.
As we show in our study, DNSSEC is essential and
critical for detection and prevention of attacks and protec-
tion of systems in light of the prevalence of sophisticated
attacks by modern adversaries.
We next summarise the topics presented in this work.
1.1 MitM is common
Contrary to folklore belief, MitM adversaries are com-
mon. We review the cache poisoning attacks in the
common settings (below) and discuss the adversarial
capabilities required to launch them.
(1) MitM on open access networks. In the early days of
the Internet, typical access of clients to Internet
services was via their (trusted) home Internet service
providers (ISPs), which, among others, provided
recursive DNS resolution services. However, during
the recent decade, we witness a growing adoption of
IEEE 802.11 wireless networks [RFC5416] and an
increasing number of clients accessing the Internet
from public, often untrusted networks. This
introduces new threats, which stem both from
malicious network operators as well as from
malicious insiders (other clients).
(2) MitM on backbone links. Powerful adversaries,
controlling routers located on backbone links have
access to all traffic, and recent revelations [10] show
that there is a practice of injecting poisoned DNS
responses into legitimate flows to redirect clients to
incorrect servers, e.g., for censorship.
(3) MitM via routing hijacking. Inter-domain routing
protocol, Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [RFC4271],
has a long history of route hijacking attacks [14], but
it still does not employ cryptographic defences to
guarantee routing correctness. Trivially, redirecting
traffic via a different route or network can provide
the attacker with MitM capabilities. Recently, such
attacks were shown to be practical [15], and such
hijacks may be frequently occurring.
1.2 Vulnerable name servers and registrars
Many of the DNS cache poisoing attacks occur by sub-
verting a registrar or a name server. In contrast to the
local nature of DNS cache poisoning attacks, which target
a specific resolver, the impact of such attacks is global, i.e.,
any resolver receiving a response from the zone file hosted
on a compromised server is a potential victim. We review
recent attacks, along with the vulnerabilities that allowed
them. We perform an evaluation of the vulnerabilities in
domain registration interfaces (which registrars provide to
customers).
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1.3 Dependencies in Domain Name System
We review the operational characteristics of the DNS
infrastructure: transitive trust, coresidence and servers
placement. We argue that these factors impact resil-
ience, stability and security of the DNS services. The
high coresidence rate can disrupt services to multi-
ple domains during benign failures or attacks on a
single name server and high concentration of name
servers in certain geographical locations can facilitate
censorship of (and attacks on) a high volume of DNS
requests.
1.4 Domain Name System security extensions
We believe that DNSSEC is the most suitable de-
fence not only for thwarting cache poisoning attacks
but also for detecting them. DNSSEC [RFC4033-4035]
is a standard cryptographic protection for DNS that
authenticates records via digital signatures. Although
proposed and standardised in 1997, DNSSEC is still
not widely deployed: most zones are not signed
and most resolvers do not validate DNSSEC-signed
responses.
Furthermore, early adopters experience failures and
deployment problems. We review some notable failures
and recommend automation of deployment as a mitiga-
tion. Our goal is to encourage deployment of DNSSEC,
and we hope that our work will foster research efforts
on the specific aspects which we identified as deterrents
towards (correct) DNSSEC deployment.
We show that DNSSEC provides cryptographic evi-
dences that can be used in forensic analysis and detection
of attacks long after they occured, in particular even
attacks launched by state entities, domain operators or
MitM adversaries. This is in contrast to all other pro-
posed defences for DNS, e.g., Eastlake cookies [16] or
DNSCurve [17].
1.5 Contributions
In this work, we show that a critical system of the Internet,
DNS, is vulnerable to attacks and that in contrast to folk-
lore belief, strong attackers, such as MitM, are common.
Attacks on DNS are detrimental for Internet clients and
services.
We show that DNSSEC is the only standardised mech-
anism which can provide evidences for forensic analysis
of attacks launched by the strong and sophisticated adver-
saries and can facilitate detection of attacks which would
otherwise remain unnoticed.
Unfortunately, as our study indicates, the adoption
of DNSSEC among zones in forward and reverse
DNS trees is extremely low. Hence, further research
is required to identify obstacles to DNSSEC deploy-
ment. We hope that our work will motivate such an
investigation.
1.6 Organisation
We review DNS and DNS cache poisoning in Section 2.
We discuss threats from (1) MitM adversaries and how
attackers can obtain MitM capabilities (Section 3) and (2)
vulnerabilities in name servers and zones hosting infras-
tructure (Section 4). We then review the dependencies
within the DNS infrastructure in Section 5. We discuss
DNSSEC and report on our measurements of DNSSEC
adoption rate and deployment challenges. We then review
application of DNSSEC for forensic analysis (Section 6).
We conclude this work in Section 7.
2 Domain Name System and cache poisoning
In this section, we provide a background on DNS and
provide a describe DNS cache poisoning. We discuss the
phases of cache poisoning in detail.
2.1 Domain Name System
The Domain Name System (DNS), [RFC1024, RFC1025],
is a distributed data base of Internet mappings (also called
resource records (RRs)), from domain names to different
values. For example, A type RRs map a domain name to its
IPv4 address.
Domains are organised hierarchically; for every domain
name α and each label or domain name x, the domain
name x.α is considered a subdomain of α, i.e., part of the α
domain name space. Namely, the rightmost label conveys
the top-level domain.
Domains and theirmappings are also administered hier-
archically; the mappings of each domain foo.bar are pro-
vided by a name server, managed by the owner of the
domain. The name server of a domain foo.bar is iden-
tified via a DNS mapping of type NS, from the domain
name to the domain name of the name server, which could
be subdomain, e.g,. ns1.foo.bar, or not, e.g., ns.goo.net.
Mappings of a domain name, e.g., x.foo.bar, are trusted
only if received from a name server of that domain or
of a parent domain, e.g., the name server of foo.bar or
of bar.
Clients use resolvers in order to find RRs for a domain.
The resolvers query the name servers to locate the
requested RRs. Upon query, a name server responds with
the corresponding RR, or a non-existing domain response
in case no matching RR exists. Resolvers cache the DNS
responses; the caching time is specified in the time to live
(TTL) field of a response, e.g., TTL of t seconds indicates
that the resolver should store the record for t seconds.
Subsequent requests for the same RRs are provided from
the cache. A sample lookup process, initiated with a DNS
request from a stub resolver, is depicted in Figure 2.
2.2 DNS cache-poisoning
In this section, we provide background on DNS cache
poisoning.
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Figure 2 Sample resolution process initiated by a stub resolver for an IP address of a web site. Recursive resolver performs the lookup and
caches the resource records from the DNS response. Subsequent requests from clients for the same RRs are satisfied from the cache.
The resolvers accept only responses for which there
are corresponding pending DNS requests; thus, the first
step in a DNS cache poisoning attack is to trigger a DNS
request. Then, after triggering the request, the second step
is to inject a spoofed response (redirecting the clients to
incorrect hosts) that will be accepted and cached by a
victim resolver.
The attackers can use a number of techniques for trig-
gering DNS requests; some techniques attack random
victims while others are targeted against specific users.
When an attacker has a direct access to a victim DNS
resolver it can repeat the cache poisoning attack and trig-
ger arbitrary number of requests at will. This is possible
if the attacker is on the same network with the victim
resolver, e.g., it is one of the clients of an ISP whose
resolver it wishes to poison.
Another option is to use an open DNS resolver. The
amount of open resolvers on the Internet is constantly
increasing, from 15 million in 2010 [18] to 30 million
in 2013 [19]. Open resolvers provide recursive DNS ser-
vices to any requesting client. This ability to trigger DNS
requests makes open resolvers more vulnerable to attacks
and, in particular, to DNS cache poisoning attacks.
Typically, DNS resolvers limit their recursive DNS ser-
vice only to clients on their networks. However, there are
techniques which the attackers can use to trigger requests
even remotely.
A known technique is by controlling a malicious script,
typically dubbed ‘puppet’ (sandboxed client) [20], such
as a client running Javascript or presenting Flash con-
tent. The attacker can accomplish this, for instance, by
purchasing an ad space from advertising web site. When
clients surf to such web sites, their browsers are redi-
rected, e.g., via images, or iframes, to retrieve objects from
other domains (in this case from attacker’s domain). This
causes the browser to load the resource from a different
(remote) domain. Once redirected, the browsers of the
clients download and run the script and become puppets.
The script runs automatically and without any interaction
with the client; see Figure 3. The script can trigger DNS
requests to domains and responses to which the (external)
attacker wishes to poison.
An attacker can also trigger DNS requests via other, less
known techniques, e.g., by sending email to a victim net-
work whose resolver it wishes to poison, see Figure 4; this
technique was first proposed in [21].
3 DNS cache poisoning by man-in-the-middle
Basic Internet protocols, such as DNS and routing, are not
cryptographically protected against MitM adversaries,
and current defences rely on challenge-response mecha-
nisms which provide security only against off-path adver-
saries. Deploying cryptography is more difficult than
merely configuring challenge-response mechanisms, and
the incorrect belief is that sinceMitM is not common, such
defences should suffice.
In this section, we argue that this belief is wrong and
review a number of common scenarios where adversaries
possess MitM capabilities. We show how easily the adver-
saries can exploit that ability and how devastating the
results may be for the victims.
3.1 MitM in open access networks
Since the early days of the Internet and until recently,
clients have accessed the Internet mostly from trusted
networks, e.g., via their ISPs or enterprise networks.
However, during the last decade, an increasing num-
ber of devices obtain Internet connectivity via public
IEEE 802.11-based wireless (Wi-Fi) networks [RFC5416],
e.g., hotels, airports, cafes or networks set up by
individuals.
The threats of using such open networks are twofold
and stem from a (1) malicious operator and a (2) malicious
client.
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Figure 3 Triggering DNS requests via a malicious script (puppet).
Both, a malicious operator and a malicious client, can
subvert correctness and availability of Internet services
for their clients. The most effective attack is by spoof-
ing DNS responses and redirecting the clients to incor-
rect (malicious) hosts, e.g., to download malware or
block responses to launch a denial/degradation of ser-
vice attacks. A malicious operator essentially has MitM
capabilities on its network since the traffic of all the
clients connected via its network traverse a router under
its control. In particular, the network operator can block
correct responses and craft spoofed responses from
scratch or can inject spoofed records into DNS response
packets.
A malicious client can gain MitM capabilities by spoof-
ing DHCP responses for newly connecting clients. In
spoofed DHCP responses, a malicious client can provide
an incorrect IP/MAC address for local recursive DNS
resolver, e.g., one that is assigned to its own network inter-
face card (NIC), and thus will receive all the DNS requests
sent by the victim client. But, MitM capabilities are not
essential for launching attacks on public wireless net-
works. In particular, every connected device can receive
all transmissions, no matter who the destination is. This
enables malicious clients to inspect all DNS requests, i.g.,
packets sent to port 53, and to craft spoofed responses
before authentic responses arrive.
Figure 4 Triggering DNS request by sending email to a victim network (simplified).
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However, attacks on correctness and availability are not
surprising and both are known threats. In what follows, we
outline a less evident threat which appears to be gaining
relevance during the recent couple of years. Specifically,
we are referring to monitoring online user activities. The
network operator, as well as other clients, can inspect
the MAC address of all the clients connected to that
network. MAC address (uniquely) identifies a network
adapter and has the same value no matter which net-
work the client connects to the Internet from. This enables
tracking the users throughout the different networks that
they use to connect to the Internet. Even benign network
operators may pose a threat, e.g., the logs may be kept
over a long time period, and may be shared with third
parties.
Such logs enable different parties, e.g., security agen-
cies, armies, content providers, to learn about the online
behaviour and habits of the clients.
3.2 MitM on backbone links
Recent revelations [10] expose monitoring and censorship
activities of National Security Agency (NSA) and Gov-
ernment Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) against
Internet services and users. The NSA used its secret
agreements with telecommunications companies to mon-
itor communications channels in order obtain access to
collect and analyse Internet traffic. The NSA uses hosts
(code name QUANTUM) to inject spoofed DNS (and
HTTP) responses: when observing a DNS request, a
spoofed response is automatically crafted and returned
to the victim client. Notice that since the QUANTUM
servers are deployed on the backbone links, they can
always respond before the legitimate server does. Since
the first correct response is accepted and the subsequent
ones are ignored, the attacker can redirect victim clients to
the servers controlled by theNSA (code name FOXACID);
the servers then install malware on clients hosts or tap on
the communication.
3.3 MitM via route poisoning
The Internet consists of multiple autonomous systems
(ASes) which are interconnected by means of routing
protocols. To enable connectivity, the networks adver-
tise their prefixes, i.e., address blocks, to the Internet via
a BGP update messages, [RFC1771]. Every BGP update
message is an indication of a routing change. Routers
issue BGP update messages when routing information
changes, e.g., link failures, topology changes, reconfigu-
rations, updates of local policies. A BGP update contains
an advertised prefix and an AS path. The last AS on
the path is the originator of the prefix. Since BGP does
not employ authentication mechanisms, originators of
BGP routing announcements may claim prefixes belong-
ing to other networks or may change routing path (by
adding or removing links), e.g., due to benign failures or
malicious attacks. Attackers can hijack prefixes by adver-
tising invalid origin or invalid next hop [14]. There is
a large body of research studying attacks on BGP rout-
ing, e.g., route hijacking and route injection that damage
network operation or connectivity.
For instance, recently, a highly publicised route hijack-
ing attack was exposed [15], which was launched over a
period of a number of months, and the attackers routed
a significant amount of traffic through Belarus and Ice-
land. Belarus Telecom was advertising a false route and
thus managed to hijack traffic which was not directed to
its prefix. Such route hijacks were believed to be theoret-
ical prior to that attack, and it showed the feasibility of
such massive MitM hijacking.
Route poisoning can be employed to leverage DNS
cache poisoning attacks. By forcing the traffic to traverse
a specific path, e.g., via a malicious network operator,
the attacker can become a MitM for the communication
to a target domain and can easily inject spoofed DNS
responses into the traffic flow.
4 Cache poisoning by subverting hosting
infrastructure
Many DNS cache poisoning attacks occur by subverting
the hosting infrastructure of DNS, e.g., domain registrar
or name servers. Indeed, there is an increasing number of
attacks by compromising the hosting side of DNS which
allows to take over victim domains. Subverting a registrar
or a name server is a lucrative avenue for cache poisoning
when the attacker is not a MitM.
Attacks compromising the hosting infrastrucutre are
frequently occurring. In 2013 alone, multiple domains
were hijacked by compromising domain name servers or
registrars; some of the notable attacks include a compro-
mise of google.rw and even top level domains like, qa,
ps, nl, be, my. Registrar, register.comwas sub-
verted, and as a result, many names related to security
like metasploit.com and bitdefender.com were
redirected.
4.1 Compromising registrars
Attackers can exploit vulnerabilities, most notably, in the
user interface, provided by the registrars. In particular,
attackers often exploit vulnerabilities in user interface,
such as lack of (or insufficient) user input validation to
perform injection attacks, e.g., buffer overflow, and obtain
a shell on the victim host. This allows to manipulate
DNS records in the zone file, resulting in cache poison-
ing attacks of the target domain. This serves as a stepping
stone to multiple attacks, e.g., enables attackers to dis-
tribute spam while passing reputation-based spam filters,
to perform phishing, malware distribution, credentials
theft.
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For instance, a security hole within 123 REGISTRATION
registrar management console resulted in the hijacking
of 300 domains back in 2012; the problem was even-
tually tracked down to an open account control panel
that had allowed changes to be made without adequate
authentication.
We tested the interfaces of a number of popular regis-
trars and found a vulnerability which may facilitate cache
poisoning attacks, even without compromising the web
interfaces: when registering a domain, the attackers can
configure legitimate name servers that belong to other
domains and are not under their control as their own.
This fact can be abused, e.g., for cache poisoining or
denial of service attacks. For instance, consider an attacker
that registers a domain under some top level domain, e.g.,
one-domain-to-rule-them-all.org, and regis-
ters a name server that belongs to another domains under
org. Then, referral responses to requests for resource
records within attacker’s domain can be exploited to poi-
son the records of the victim domain whose name server
record the attacker used.
Unfortunately, detecting and preventing such attacks is
challenging and would require the registries to validate the
ownership over the records at registration time.
4.2 Compromising name servers
There is a long history of attacks exploiting vulnerabili-
ties in the name servers, e.g., vulnerable operating system
or vulnerable DNS software. This is a stepping stone to
obtain unauthorised access to the system and to execute
arbitrary code. Vulnerabilities were registered in popular
operating systems andDNS software, e.g., MS server, Bind
versions, PowerDNS.
Some of the known attacks exploited known vulnerabil-
ities, such as (1) buffer overflow, which allows an attacker
to obtain unauthorised access to the system and exe-
cution of arbitrary code, (2) inproper handling of input
values, e.g., one attack exploited vulnerable error handling
routine that would crash on invalid DNS transaction iden-
tifier values, (3) improper check of memory copy, e.g.,
would crashed the server allowing an attacker to gain root
privileges on name server, and many others.
5 Dependencies in Domain Name System
Dependencies within the DNS infrastructure further
exacerbate the impact of cache poisoning attacks or com-
promises of name servers or registrars [11]. We consider
the following types of dependencies: (1) inter-domain
dependencies via transitive trust and (2) zones coresi-
dence due to name servers sharing and (3) dependencies
via registrars.
Our study encompassed top 50 K Alexa domains and
568 TLDs. We also measured all the domains depending
on these Alexa domains and TLDs via a transitive trust,
which resulted in a total of 150 K domains. These domains
are served by 48 K name servers; these 48 K name servers
have 65 K different IP addresses, since sometimes a single
name server is assigned a number of IP addresses.
5.1 Transitive trust
A transitive trust dependency can be twofold: (1) a name
server can appear in a number of transitive trust chains
(i.e., the number of domains that can be impacted by a fail-
ure of a specific name server) and (2) a domain can depend
on multiple domains for its resolution (i.e., impact of a
failure of a single server on the latency or availability of
a domain). The former impacts the resilience of the DNS
infrastructure and the latter the resilience of a specific
domain. Ideally, both should be low.
Our study shows that on average, a domain in top
50 K Alexa depends on 43.5 other domains via transitive
trust chains, and on average, a domain in TLD depends
on 43.7 domains via transitive trust chains. The max-
imal number of transitive trust dependencies in Alexa
domains is 220 and in TLDs is 183. For instance, domain
sigcomm.com, ranked 373097 on Alexa, is hosted at
dnsmadeeasy.com, coresidingwith 400 other domains.
Figure 5 plots the cumulative distribution function
(CDF) F(x) = Pr[X ≤ x] of the number of name servers
appearing in transitive trust chains of top 50 K Alexa
domains and TLDs; this encompasses dependency (1) -
and increases traffic volume to name servers and reso-
lution latency for clients. The CDF curves for the Alexa
domains and TLDs represents the number of transitive
trust chains that name servers in Alexa domains (resp.
TLDs) appears in. Approximately, 50% of name servers
appear in two or more transitive trust chains. More than
90% of the name servers appear in eight and less chains.
Some name servers appear in more than 128 transitive
trust chains.
Figure 6 plots the CDF of the transitive trust dependen-
cies of Alexa top 50 K domains and TLDs; this expresses
dependency (2) - and increases resolution time for clients’.
Approximately, 50% depend on 20 or more other domains
for their resolution, and more than 90% depend on more
than 128 domains.
Name servers with high dependencies via transitive
trust, i.e., whereby multiple domains depend on them
for their resolution, have two side effects: (1) they
can become a lucrative target for attacks. For instance,
recently, Herzberg and Shulman [3] showedhow to launch
a DNS cache poisoning attack using fragmented DNS
responses to replace the authentic IP address of a vic-
tim name server with a spoofed one and ran this against
sns-pb.isc.org name server, which appears in 69
transitive trust chains of other domains.
(2) Another notable side effect is that large transi-
tive trust chains introduce more latency to resolution



















Figure 5 Name servers appearing in transitive trust chains of top 50 K Alexa domains and TLDs.
of records within domains depending on many other
domains and increase the queries rate to name servers
appearing in multiple transitive trust chains. Our study
measured an increase of 50 ms for every transitive trust
chain of three links, when measured with a cold (empty)
cache. Resolutions of larger chains, e.g., 200, can often
result in timeouts and unnecessary retransmissions, over-
loading the network and the name server, and increasing
the latency for clients’ queries.
Transitive trust dependencies also nullify effectiveness
of DNSSEC, [RFC4033-RFC4035], and impede its adop-
tion. In particular, if name servers or other resources of
a signed zone are placed under unsigned domains, the
DNS resolver will not be able to establish the security of
the signed records, and the security will depend on the
security of the weakest link in a transitive trust chain.
5.2 Coresidence
Hosting a number of zones files on the same name server
enables DNS name server operators to optimise profit and
reduce operational costs and management overhead. We
measure and quantify the dependencies between zones,
namely the fraction of zone files residing on the same phys-
ical server. We measure the coresidence among TLDs
and top 50 K Alexa domains, including the coresidence
between name servers appearing in their transitive trust
dependencies. As our results, plotted in see Figure 7, indi-
cate, the coresidence rate among the name servers are
extremely high. We found that coresidence of multiple
zones on the same name server is a common practice
among Alexa domains and TLDs. In particular, more than
70% of the name servers of Alexa domains and more than
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Figure 6 Transitive trust dependencies in top 50 K Alexa and TLDs.
























Figure 7 Zones coresidence on name servers among 50 K-top Alexa domains and TLD and servers in transitive trust dependencies of
Alexa domains and TLDs.
Some name servers host more than 500 zone files, such as
the name server pdns.ultradns.net.
The implication of high coresidence rate is that a failure
or a DoS attack against the availability of the name server
or the network hosting it impacts the availability of all of
the zones hosted on it. An attack against a name server,
e.g., exploiting a vulnerability in a DNS software or in the
operating system can enable the attacker to take control
over the name server and inject records into the zone files
hosted on it. We also find that high coresidence increases
loss and failures.
5.3 Dependencies via registrars
Many DNS cache poisoning attacks occur by subverting
the hosting infrastructure of DNS, e.g., domain regis-
trar or name servers. By exploiting social engineering or
vulnerabilities in domains registration interface, an attack
against an infrastructure, run by a registrar, may expose
all of the domains using it to domain hijacking attacks.
Subverting a registrar or a name server is a lucrative
avenue for cache poisoning when the attacker is not a
MitM. Indeed, there is an increasing number of attacks by
compromising the hosting side of DNS.
We quantify the dependencies between domains and
registrars. In our study, we measured dependencies
between 1003 ICANN accredited registrars and 18 pop-
ular TLDs. Figures 8 and 9 depict the inter-dependencies
between registrars and domains. In particular, Figure 8
shows dependencies of popular TLDs. On average, a
domain depends on almost 600 registrars, with the max-
imum reaching over 1 K as in the case of the com TLD.
Attack against any of these registrars, on which a single
Figure 8 Dependencies between TLDs and registrars accredited to manage them.


















Figure 9 Dependencies between TLDs and registerars, showing fraction of TLDs that registrars are accredited to manage.
domain depends, may suffice to hijack its subdomains
and even the domain itself. Figure 9 shows the fraction
of TLDs under which registrars can register subdomains.
The implication is that subverting a single registrar may
allow the attacker to hijack or register subdomains under
all the TLDs that the registrar is accredited to manage.
6 DNS security extensions
Due to the critical function that DNS fulfills, it is highly
reactive to new threats and attacks, constantly responding
with new defence mechanisms. In particular, to miti-
gate the detrimental damages of cache poisoning attacks,
IETF designed and standardised a cryptographic defence
for DNSSEC [RFC4033-RFC4035]. DNSSECwas designed
to address the cache poisoning vulnerability in DNS by
providing data integrity and origin authenticity via cryp-
tographic digital signatures over DNS resource records.
The digital signatures enable the recipient, e.g., resolver,
that supports DNSSEC validation, to check that the data
in a DNS response is the same as the data published within
the target zone.
A secure DNS would be resilient to cache poisoning
attacks and would facilitate a wide range of applications
and systems, such as secure routing (with ROVER, [22]),
secure email, (with PGP keys distribution [23]). For the
protection of DNSSEC to kick in, the zones need to be
signed starting with the trust anchor (the root zone) all
the way down to the target domain to enable the resolver
to establish a chain of trust. The name server has to serve
signed responses, and the resolver has to validate the sig-
natures and keys in the responses; see an illustration of the
chain of trust establishment process in Figure 10.
DNSSEC defines new resource records (RRs) to store
signatures and keys used to authenticate the DNS
responses. For example, a type RRSIG record contains a
signature authenticating an RR set, i.e., all mappings of a
specific type for a certain domain name. By signing only
RR sets, and not specific responses,DNSSEC allows signa-
tures to be computed off-line, and not upon request; this is
important, both for performance (since signing is compu-
tationally intensive) and security (since the signing key can
be stored in a more secure location than the name server).
To allow clients to authenticate DNS data, each zone
generates a signing and verification key pair (sk, vk). The
signing key sk is used to sign the zone data and should
be secret and kept offline. Upon queries for records in a
domain, the name server returns the requested RRs, along
with the corresponding signatures (in a RRSIG RRs). To
prevent replay attacks, each signature has a fixed expira-
tion date. The clients, i.e., resolvers, should also obtain the
zone’s public verification key vk, stored in a DNSKEY RR,
which is then used by the clients to authenticate the origin
and integrity of the DNS data.
Resolvers are configured with a set of verification keys
for specific zones called trust anchors; in particular, all
resolvers have the verification key (trust anchor) for the
root zone. The resolver obtains other verification keys,
which are not trust anchors, by requesting a DNSKEY
resource record from the domain. To validate these verifi-
cation keys obtained from DNSKEY, the resolver obtains
a corresponding DS RR from the parent zone, which con-
tains a hash of the public key of the child; the resolver
accepts the DNSKEY of the child as authentic if the
hashed value inDNSKEY is the same as the value in theDS
record at the parent and that DS record is properly signed
(in a corresponding RRSIG record). Since the DS record
at the parent is signed with the DNSKEY of the parent,
authenticity is guaranteed.
This process constructs a chain of trust which allows the
resolver to authenticate the public verification key of the
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Figure 10 A (simplified) sample process of constructing a chain of trust from the root zone. For ease of presentation in this illustration, the RRs
maintained by the name servers are enumerated, and we specify the exchanged RRs by indicating the corresponding numbers above the arrows.
target zone. Specifically, the clients authenticate the pub-
lic verification key of the zone by constructing a chain of
trust starting at the root zone, or another trust anchor, and
terminating at the target zone.
6.1 DNSSEC deployment
Although proposed in 1997, DNSSEC is still not widely
deployed: less than 3% of the DNS resolvers validate
DNSSEC records in DNS responses [24]; recent measure-
ments of DNSSEC adoption on forward and reverse DNS
trees show that less than 1% of the zones are signed, [25].
We summarise the results in Table 1. The first col-
umn contains the number of registered domains that were
tested. This is mainly relevant in the reverse DNS tree,
Table 1 DNSSEC deploymentmeasurements in forward
and reverse DNS trees
Domain Registered Name servers Signed
Forward DNS Alexa 50 K 32.5 K 0.46%
Forward DNS TLDs 568 3.2 K 62%
rDNS x.in-addr.arpa. 229 1.5 K 84%
rDNS y.x.in-addr.arpa. 28 K 97 K 0.4%
rDNS z.y.x.in-addr.arpa. 2, 767 K 9,687 K 0.06%
where a large fraction of the domains (that correspond to
IPv4 address blocks) are not registered.
The second column contains the number of name
servers in each domain space. In forward DNS, 62% of the
TLDs are signed and less than 1% (0.46%) of top million
Alexa domains are signed.
In a reverse DNS, there are only 0.07% signed zones
in total; this is surprising since the reverse DNS is
commonly utilised by security mechanisms. Notice that
very few of the reverse DNS domains, that correspond
to classes B and C (i.e., x.y.in-addr.arpa and
x.y.z.in-addr.arpa), are signed (only 0.4% and
0.06% respectively). This means that even if the lower
domains decide to adopt DNSSEC, the resolvers will not
be able to establish a chain of trust to them.
Such a low adoption of DNSSEC among domains may
be an indication of deployment challenges that needs to
be investigated and mitigated. We hope that our work will
further motivate such study.
6.2 Operational challenges
There are a number of challenges related to deploy-
ment of DNSSEC, which we studied in our earlier work
[26,27]. In this section, we discuss operational challenges
and outages. According to our study, the outages are
mainly related to errors in key rollover and to zone
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signingprocedure. For instance, in January 2012, Comcast
(a large ISP) stopped serving responses for nasa.gov.
This immediately incited speculations whether Comcast
was blocking nasa.gov. In reality, nasa.gov served
incorrect signatures over its DNS records, and the val-
idating resolvers of Comcast discarded those ‘invalid’
responses; the resolvers of Comcast were functioning cor-
rectly since such incorrectly signed records could also
constitute an attack.
In August 2013, a mistake in key rollover, whereby
instead of signing with both the old key and the new one,
only the new key was used, causes an outage of domains
under gov TLD. The impact was that 18 million clients
of comcast Internet provider, more than 70 customers
of Google Public DNS and validating Internet providers
all over the globe (e.g., Sweden, Czech, Brazil) could not
access domains under gov TLD.
There were also a number of other publicised failures,
which resulted in broken DNS functionality for victim
networks. Most, if not all, of the failures are related to
human errors, and operational challenges in DNSSEC
could be mitigated by automating the signing and key
rollover procedures.
6.3 Forensics, evidences and detectionwith DNSSEC
In this section, we show that DNSSEC can be useful
for detection of attacks and in forensic analysis. The
feature that makes this possible are digital signatures,
which can be validated and verified by anyone with the
possession of a public verification key. Signatures pro-
vide a valuable information for forensic analysis and can
enable identification, e.g., of the exact time that the net-
work was attacked and to which hosts the traffic was
redirected.
In contrast to the relative time indicated in the TTL field
in DNS records, the cryptographic signatures contain an
absolute expiration date and the date the signature was
generated. The signatures also contain the tag of the cryp-
tographic material (algorithm, hash, key) that was used to
produce the signature.
Notice that since the cryptographic signatures should be
impossible to forge for efficient adversaries, only the entity
in possession of a cryptographic signing key, or a very
strong adversary with huge computational power, should
be able to craft valid signatures. Thus, a forged signature
is an indication of a very strong adversary, such as a gov-
ernment, or an indication that the zone, which provided
the spoofed record with a valid signature, may be mali-
cious or subverted. In what follows, we consider how to
analyse attacks or detect breaches, performed by strong
adversaries, a posteriori.
We propose to utilise DNSSEC to design a system
that would enable analysis of attacks, provide evidences
of attacks that took place and even enable detection
of some attacks. The system would need to collect the
DNS responses (along with the corresponding signa-
tures and cryptographic keys), e.g., by configuring suitable
rules in the firewall, and store them in a database for
processing.
6.3.1 Forensic analysis
The time stamps on the signatures provide a valuable
information, allowing to analyse when a certain mapping
was considered valid, and when it constitutes an attack.
For instance, consider an organisation that had a network
block 1.2.3.0/24 and then moved to a different Internet
provider and received a new address block 5.6.7.0/24. All
the servers that once occupied a block 1.2.3.0/24were also
moved to address block 5.6.7.0/24. Thus, responses with
mappings from the block 1.2.3.0/24 are no longer valid,
and if a resolver on some network receives records with
mapping from old block, this may be an indication of an
attack.
The time fields in the signatures (over the DNS records)
enable network operators to analyse when the spoofed
records were supplied and if the records reflect the real
mappings at the time that they were supplied.
6.3.2 Evidences
It may often be desirable to prove to a third party, e.g.,
judge, registrar or domain operator, that attack took place.
For instance, consider a case where a customer’s private
data was breached via a redirection to a malicious host.
The customer can present the malicious records (which
were used in the course of the attack) along with the cryp-
tographic signatures, to a third party, and any third party
can be convinced by validating the signatures. Another
example is of a stronger adversary, for instance a state,
that forces com domain to redirect all traffic destined to
one of its subdomains, e.g., a Chinese enterprise Huawei
Huawei.com, to different servers. Since com signs the
delegation records for Huawei.com, it can also produce
valid signatures for those new servers. If the attack is
detected, those signatures can indicate that the incident
was not a benign failure or mistake, but a malicious attack,
which involved resigning the delegation records belonging
to Huawei.com.
Such evidences are not available with other crypto-
graphic defences that were proposed for DNS, most
notably Eastlake cookies [16] and DNSCurve [17].
6.3.3 Detection
DNS is a distributed infrastruture, and a single domain
is often served by mutliple name servers. Further-
more, many name servers are also distributed, e.g., via
the ANYCAST technology, [RFC1546], where a DNS
request is rerouted to the topologically nearest name
server.
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The attacks that we discussed in Sections 3 and 4
were launched against a specific name server or a traffic
that was exchanged with a specific instance of the name
server, e.g., the attacker either subverted a name server,
or injected spoofed responses into a communication flow
with a name server. Indeed, it is much more difficult (if
not impossible) to subvert all of the name servers of some
target domain. This would require an attacker that can
eavesdrop on multiple Internet links that belong to differ-
ent autonomous systems (AS) or to compromise all the
name servers. Since this should be impossible even for
states and military organisations, we use this as a basic
premise in the detection technique which we propose
next.
The fact that the adversary can compromise only some
of the links and servers means that the different name
servers (and different instances thereof) will return differ-
ent responses to DNS requests.
Networks could establish trustworthiness and correct-
ness of the DNS responses, by querying the differ-
ent name servers (and instances thereof), belonging to
target domains. To query name servers instances dis-
tributed via an ANYCAST, the network could use proxies
located in different parts of the Internet. The inconsis-
tencies, if found, would be carefully checked to test for
attacks.
7 Conclusions
A secure DNS is critical for stability and functionality
of the Internet. In this work, we review DNS security.
We show that current defences do not suffice against
common attackers and the DNS infrastructure is vulner-
able to cache poisoning. We also experimentally measure
the dependencies within DNS. Our results indicate that
attacks against a single weak link can impact multiple
dependent domains.
A significant problem pertaining to many attacks is
that it is impossible to detect them (unless they break
connectivity or disrupt the ‘expected’ functionality). We
show that DNSSEC could not only prevent many of the
attacks but could also be used to enable detection of
the attacks and as well as a posteriori forensic anal-
ysis of the attacks. DNSSEC also can be used to
generate cryptographic evidences, which would enable
victims to prove to the third parties, e.g., insurance
organisations, judges, Internet operators, that attacks
and breaches took place. To best of our knowledge,
our work is the first to propose such applications of
DNSSEC.
However, deployment and operation of DNSSEC are
challenging; we discuss problems and recommend coun-
termeasures. We hope that our work will raise awareness
to the vulnerabilities and the potential of DNSSEC to
facilitate forensic analysis of attacks.
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